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ABSTRACT 
 
This investigation verifies the impact of corporate governance measure on the likelihood of 
financial distress on the Spanish Stock Exchange for the time period from 2007 to 2012. The 
authors applied an empirical study with panel data and conducted regression logistic models with 
the objective to calculate different measures of goodness of fit. The results of this study show that 
the prediction power of the financial distress models improves with the incorporation of some 
corporate governance measures.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ne of the most questioned elements in the actual economic crisis has been the role of corporate 
governance in the development of companies' decline. Specifically, previous research emphasizes the 
agency problems between managers and shareholder, when the companies are in a context of financial 
distress situation, and the role of board of directors in its function of monitoring and controlling managerial 
opportunism behavior in those cases. In this sense, a large body of literature has highlighted the importance of 
corporate governance and its influence on the likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy (Donker et al., 2009; 
Fich & Slezak, 2008; Lajili & Zéghal, 2010; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008). However, these researchs have been 
limited to certain context, such as U.S., Taiwan and China, and on bankruptcy or legal processes. For this reason, the 
extension of analysis to other geographic context and to other financial distress situations different to bankruptcy 
contributes to complement the existing literature. 
 
The Spanish context has corporate governance characteristics that differ from other contexts, such as 
unitary board system, ownership concentration, and voluntary good governance practices. In this context, the 
literature asserts that it is more likely that there is important agency conflict in financial distress situations. So, the 
study of relationship between corporate governance and financial distress of Spanish firms provides evidence for 
this type of contexts. Therefore, this research aims to verify if the incorporation of corporate governance measure in 
the financial distress prediction model increases the accuracy level compared to models based solely on economic 
and financial data.  
 
The authors used data from Spanish-listed companies between 2007 and 2012 and applied panel data 
statistical methodology in order to answer the main research objective as explained above. Results corroborate that, 
also in contexts of concentrated ownership and unitary board system, where the ability of monitoring and control on 
managers by board is lower than dispersed ownership contexts, the accuracy level of financial distress prediction 
models increases as a result of the addition of corporate governance variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
O 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 
The ownership structure and the ability of the board to act efficiently have been regarded as important 
determinants of businesses’ financial distress. So, the role of ownership structure and board composition and 
structure on the likelihood of business financial distress should be examined. 
 
Ownership Structure  
 
Previous studies provide arguments about the influence of ownership concentration and board ownership on 
the likelihood of financial distress. Regarding ownership concentration, since large shareholders could suffer great 
losses for their participation in a financially distressed company, it is expected that they exercise an important 
monitoring function on opportunistic management behavior, reducing the likelihood of incurring in a financial 
distress situation (Donker et al., 2009; Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001). Respecting board ownership, the convergence 
theory argues that the participation of the board of directors in shareholding is also a powerful incentive to achieve the 
alignment of their interests with those of other shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997); that is, maximizing the value 
of shares. Following this idea, it is expected that directors will fight for the survival of the firms in which they hold 
shares.  
 
Board Structure 
 
The business failure literature shows that weak or poor corporate governance increases the probability to 
opportunistic behavior of management or controlling shareholders to act in their own interest, extracting wealth 
from other shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000) and increasing the likelihood of financial 
distress.  The board of directors’ weakness has been measured through its composition and structure; that is, 
independence of its members and number of directors (size). The independence of the board has been measured 
according to the separation of duties of the CEO and Chairman and proportion of independent directors on the 
board. Regarding the first, there is no consensus about the effect of CEO duality (same person assumes the CEO and 
Chairman functions) on likelihood of financial distress. The positive effect (CEO duality increases the financial 
distress’ likelihood) is attributed to lack of independence and monitoring effectiveness on managers by board 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen M., 1993). Contrarily, the negative effect (CEO duality reduces the 
likelihood of financial distress) is associated to strong leadership and control unit, which improves the transmission 
of information, reduces coordination costs, and avoids the emergence of potential conflicts of interest between CEO 
and Chairman (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Despite this lack of consensus, the results 
demonstrated the influence of CEO duality on the likelihood of financial distress, in one or another direction.  
 
About the presence of independent directors on the board, literature points out that they are more effective 
to monitor managers’ opportunistic behaviors (Chang, 2009; Daily, 1995; Fich & Slezak, 2008). According to this 
approach, as the empirical evidence demonstrates, firms with higher proportion of outside directors are less likely to 
fail due to they are more efficient in imposing the necessary measures to help overcome a possible failure situation 
(Deng & Wang, 2006; Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001; Fich & Slezak, 2008).  
 
Respecting board size, previous literature supports two different perspectives. On the one hand, the 
Resource Dependence Theory argues that larger boards offer various advantages associated with the company's 
ability to access the resources and information held by the directors and that might be needed to achieve the business 
objectives (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1973). From this perspective, the size of the board would be negatively 
associated with the likelihood of business failure. In contrast, previous studies reveal some problems related to big 
size of the board, such as greater discretion of its members to meet their particular interests to the detriment of the 
general interest of the company (Chaganti et al., 1985) or lack of effectiveness when turbulent economic 
environments require a change in strategic direction (Goodstein et al., 1994). From this point of view, smaller boards 
are more effective in the implementation of mechanisms for corporate control (Jensen, 1993), thereby decreasing the 
chances of the company to achieve unstable economic and financial situations (Fich & Slezak, 2008). 
 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – Special Issue 2014 Volume 13, Number 7 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1621 The Clute Institute 
In this sense, the authors suggest that the addition of corporate governance variables to the financial distress 
prediction models, built with financial ratios, contributes to increase their level of accuracy. So, they propose the 
following research hypothesis: 
 
H1. Corporate governance variables help to improve the level of accuracy of traditional financial distress 
prediction models (based solely on financial ratios). 
 
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
 
In order to test the financial distress prediction models' improvement by incorporation of corporate 
governance measures, data were collected from 70 Spanish-listed firms during the time period from 2007 to 2012 
and an empirical study with panel data and applied cross-sectional statistical methodology, such as a binary logistic 
regression, was conducted. For this, two logistic regression models were used: 
 
(1) Model based on Financial Data (FDL) (Pindado et al., 2008): 
 
FD= β0 + β1 PROF + β2FE + β3RE + dt + ηit + uit 
 
(2) Model based on Financial Data and Corporate Governance Variables (FDLCG): 
 
FD = β0 + β1PROFit + β2FEit + β3REit + β4OWNERSIGit + β5OWNERDit + β6CEODit + β7BOit  +  β8BSit + β9 ∑ CVit + 
dt + ηi + uit 
 
where FD = Financial distress.  A financial distress situation is considered when a firm meets some of the following 
conditions: (1) its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are lower that its 
financial expenses for two consecutive years and/or (2) a fall in its market value occurs between two consecutive 
periods. Under this approach, the authors have constructed a binary dependent variable which takes the value 1 if 
the company meets one of the above criteria and 0, otherwise. 
 
PROF: profitability measured as earnings before interest and taxes by the total assets at the beginning of the period 
FE: financial expenses measured as financial expenses by the total assets at the beginning of the period 
RE: retained earnings is total earnings of a firm by the total assets at the beginning of the period 
OWNERSIG: ownership concentration measured as the percentage of shares owned by large shareholders 
OWNERD: board ownership is the percentage of shares owns by members of the board of directors 
CEOD: CEO duality that is measured with a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when there is duality and 0 in 
other cases 
BO: outside board measured as the proportion of independent director on the total number of directors 
BS: board side represents the numbers of members on board 
CV: control variables are firm size (logarithm of total assets) and industry 
i: the cross sectional unit (company, i=1,…,N) 
t: the time period (year, t=1,…,T) 
dt: the time effect 
ηi:represents the individual effect 
uit: the random disturbance 
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Table 1 shows the results for the logistic regression models and their adjusted goodness measures.  
 
Table 1: Logistic Regression Models 
 FDL FDLCG 
Variables Beta Sig. Odds Ratio Beta Sig. Odds Ratio 
PROF -3.851 0.000 .0212 -4.241 0.000 0.014 
FE 10.931 0.038 55.723 16.665 0.008 2.407 
RE -0.111 0.684 0.8951 -0.239 0.439 0.787 
OWNERSIG - - - 0.5812 0.148 1.788 
OWNERD - - - -1.120 0.030 0.325 
CEOD - - - 0.494 0.057 1.639 
BO - - - -1.081 0.136 0.339 
BS - - - 0.141 0.751 1.014 
LOGTA - - - -0.247 0.020 0.780 
INDUSTRY (Dummies) - - - - - - 
Constant -0.391 0.190 - 4.49 0.017 - 
-2 Log Likelihood -266.153 -255.454 
McFadden R Squared Adjusted 0.047 0.048 
R Cuadrado de Nagelkerke 0.137 0.197 
Percent Correct Prediction 
(Noted: No-Predicted: No) 
Specificity 
54.26% 60.11% 
Percent Correct Prediction 
(Noted: Yes. Predicted) 
Sensitivity 
71.98% 78.45% 
Overall Percentage Prediction 64.05% 70.24% 
ROC Curve 0.6918 0.7305 
Source: Authors’ own 
 
The measures of goodness of fit show that both models (Model based on Financial Data (FDL) and Model 
based on Financial Data and Corporate Governance Variables (FDLCG)) have good overall results.  However, on 
the one hand, although the square of R and McFadden Nalgerkerke indicate an acceptable overall fit, it is slightly 
higher for the model that includes the variables of corporate governance (FDLGC) than for the model which has 
only economic and financial variables. This is due to the specificity of the models; that is, the probability of 
correctly determining a stable financial position, which is 54.26% in the FDL model compared to 60.11% in the 
FDLCG model. All of this is observed in the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves. 
 
On the other hand, the overall accuracy percentage of prediction of a financial distress situation is improved 
in the model that has the corporate governance variables being 70.24% compared to 64.05% of the model that has 
only economic and financial variables.  
 
For the above-mentioned, the authors conclude that the inclusion of corporate governance variables in a 
model with solely financial data increases the prediction capacity of a financial distress situation. Therefore, these 
results confirm Hypothesis 1. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings show that the incorporation of corporate governance measures in financial distress prediction 
models, based solely on financial variables, improves the accuracy level of these models, even though it may seem 
that, in contexts of concentrated ownership and unitary board systems, the effectiveness of corporate governance 
measures is more limited than in other contexts. 
 
These results should be of interest to rating agencies and financial institutions in order to improve their 
insolvency risk prediction models by incorporation of corporate governance variables.   
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